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Abstract 
To understand the way in which Ryle approaches the mind-body issue – given his views on the scope and methodology of 
philosophy and on the complex relations among thinking, language, and reality – and the significance he assigned to the 
critique of what he called “traditional doctrine”, one needs to make a brief exposé of what Ryle saw as the paradigm of 
dualism: the Cartesian doctrine of the two substances. Ryle seeks to demonstrate that by its unilateral nature, the doctrine 
(and, later on, functionalism) ignored essential elements of the human being’s specificity: one’s mental life and one’s ego. 
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1. Introduction 
The current paper is a theoretical approach of metaphysics of the mind, having an area of interest in thought 
experiments and the abstract, as perceived by the history of philosophy. This approach is entitled to be regarded 
as an interdisciplinary one, at least through philosophy of mind’s simplistic definition, seen as a branch of 
philosophy studying the mind-body distinction, as well as other topics, such as mental phenomena, consciousness 
and the ego, all topics analyzed over the following pages from the perspective of Gilbert Ryle and the novelty 
that he brought to philosophy.  
To Descartes, the mind and the body (the spirit and the matter) represent two substances of secondary nature 
(in the sense that they have been created by God, the primal matter, but they do not depend on any other creation, 
for their existence), and whose essential and mutually-exclusive attributes are thinking and extension. Hence, 
their specific properties: the body (which is the same with the space it occupies) is extended – therefore divisible, 
as it exists in space and time, whereas the spirit is un-extended, therefore indivisible and existing only in time. 
The faculties of the mind (comprehension, imagination, emotion, will) do not imply a division thereof into sub-
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systems with specific functions. In knowledge terms, the knowledge of the spirit is immediate – therefore more 
precise, whereas that of the body is mediated by the mind – therefore less exact.  
In principle, the difficulty that Descartes did not manage to solve satisfactorily was that of the interaction 
between  the  two  substances:  by  wishing  to  distinguish  them  as  best  as  possible  in  order  to  have  a  clearer  
understanding of them, he isolated them in absolute heterogeneity, so much so that he could no longer account 
for how they determined each other, although he acknowledged that this took place – at least in the case of the 
human being. This was the reason why he had to include God into the explanation, but his model remains 
unconvincing. 
As to the way in which Cartesian dualism has been interpreted by contemporary thinkers, we will stop at 
Gilbert Ryle’s outlook in this regard, which he presented in his work, “The Concept of Mind”. 
2. Summary 
In this work, he calls the doctrine “Descartes’ myth”. He shows that the error – consisting mainly in a radical 
separation and opposition of the mind and body – was not only Descartes’. It was the climax of a history of ideas 
that included Platonism, Aristotelianism, the Stoics, the Augustinian doctrine of volition, the scholastic and 
reformed theology, the Calvinist doctrine of sin and Grace, as well as the 17th century mechanics, as formulated 
by Galileo and his disciples (Ryle, 1984, pp. 23-24).  
2.1. Demolishing the Cartesian myth 
By setting out to virtually rectify the logical geography of knowledge and to “correct the errors of thought and 
expression” in the day-to-day, scientific, and – of course – philosophical language, Ryle maintained that many 
philosophical problems appeared as a result of a misunderstanding, and misuse of, ordinary language” (Shand,  
1988, p. 330). One of the ways in which such “misunderstandings” appeared was what Ryle called “organization 
errors”, which cause us to assume wrongly that a given concept refers to a certain type of entity. In general, this 
leads to erroneous ontological approaches, namely to the tendency to postulate the existence of all sorts of 
entities, about which we are misled and about which we assume that they exist – simply because we misinterpret 
the language.  
Ryle applied this concept to his theory about the mind (spirit, intellect), which is less of a constructive 
approach than it is his personal disapproval of the Cartesian view that held that the spirit was a sort of “ghostly 
matter” (Shand, 1988, p. 331).  
The Cartesian substantialist ontology was, in Ryle’s opinion, one of the main “culprits for the distortion of 
conceptual geography” regarding the highly-important field of intellect/mind. The British philosopher 
appreciated that “A myth” (such as Descartes’) “is certainly not a fairy tale. It is a presentation of facts that 
belong to a category, in a terminology which belongs to another category. Consequently, rejecting a myth does 
not mean denying facts, but re-arranging them. It is precisely what I am trying to do” (Ryle, 1984, p. 10). 
If “Descartes’ myth” is the product of a corruption of conceptual geography, then its rejection can only mean a 
restoration of the latter through a correct mapping: “To establish the logic of the geography of concepts is to 
reveal the logic of the sentences in which they are used, namely which other sentences they are consistent or 
inconsistent with, what sentences may be deduced from these, and from what sentences they ensue. The logical 
type/category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is legitimately logical to operate with it. 
The key-arguments presented in this book are therefore meant to show why certain operations with concepts 
related to mental faculties/processes constitute breaches of the rules of logic. I will try to use my own argument 
by reduction ad absurdum both in order to repudiate operations that are implicitly recommended by the Cartesian 
myth and to show to which logical types the investigated concepts should be subscribed” (Ryle, 1984, p. 10).  
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As against (and in opposition to) the body, the mind does not exist in the space, neither are its operations 
subject to mechanical laws. The operations of a mind are not and cannot be directly attested by outside observers, 
since their manifestation is private. Only “I” can have a direct knowledge of the states and processes of my own 
mind. Which is why a person lives in the context of two parallel histories – one being that of the body, the other, 
that of the mind. The former is public, the latter is private.  
While critiquing the Cartesian doctrine, Ryle chooses to picture two personal histories of man, seen as a mind-
body synthesis: a public one (belonging to the body) and a private one (belonging to the mind (Ryle, 1984, p. 12). 
The former takes place in the physical world, while the latter takes place in the “mental world”. All this leads 
Ryle to build – in order to depict “Descartes’ myth” – a metaphorical image that he calls “the dogma of the Ghost 
in the machine” (Ryle, 1984, p. 16), where the mind is the ghost, and the machine is the body. Ryle is therefore 
suggesting a new approach of the body/mind relation. He sets out to eliminate the opposition between body and 
mind, yet not by the absorption of one into the other. This is because he believes that there is no polar opposition 
between mind and matter; the opposition exists only for those who believe that the idea of mind and that of body 
belong to the same logical type. It follows then that the very distinction between idealism and materialism 
becomes meaningless. This is because in Ryle’s opinion, it is legitimate for us to say “in a logical tone of voice” 
that there are minds, and in a different tone, that there are bodies. Yet these expressions do not indicate two 
species of existence but only two different meanings of the verb “to exist”, in the same way that one states that 
“there are prime numbers, as well as Wednesdays and public opinions, and ships” (Ryle, 1984, p. 23). 
2.2. Psychological approaches of the pure philosophical concept of mind / body. 
Psychological behaviorism – the most prestigious version of behaviourism – has strong historical roots; in that 
sense, one could evoke the Stagirite’s work (About Nature). Another version of behaviourism, just as the one that 
was put forward by Gilbert Ryle, is logical behaviorism. Ryle’s definition of his view on behaviourism – at the 
end of the book The Concept of Mind relies firstly on the fact that he does not adhere to a mechanistic causality 
resulted from the study of the stimulus-response relation.  
Implementing new technological ideas leads not only to increased confidence in science and technology, but 
also to a rushed generalisation of the concepts of energy and information in the social and humanistic field, which 
triggers the creation of functionalism as a viewpoint on the body/mind matter. By promoting the idea that the 
psyche is a kind of software of the body, functionalists were ready to “export” the concept-based system used to 
describe the computer when describing the human body and psyche. Gilbert Ryle and many other mentalists who 
were much more reserved about the body/mind diagnosis had much trouble combating this viewpoint – 
functionalism – which was dominant during his time. 
In fact, by emphasizing the lack of basis in the substantial body/mind distinction, Gilbert Ryle does nothing 
but re-bring it to the foreground, this time as a conceptual triad belonging to the 20th century science: matter, 
energy, information. Although he risks taking us on false leads, the British philosopher makes a convincing 
presentation of the difficulties of the body/mind problem, toning down both the behaviourists’ exaggerations and 
the enthusiasm of the functionalists who are prone to rushed generalizations based on the hardware/software 
pattern. 
This  metaphysical  Ego,  of  “mysterious”  nature  (Ryle,  1984,  p.  186)  –  as  Gilbert  Ryle  describes  it  –  has  
indubitable self-evidence, provided by an intuition of its own mental processes that only it can access. The 
problem that was left unsolved by the French rationalist was knowing the other Ego; that is, the difficulty raised 
by solipsism (the classic aporia of the Ego-centred philosophy), which, according to several critics, Descartes 
was never able to exit. There is, of course, a possibility to overcome that difficulty, which Descartes himself 
perceived, by bringing in a certification of clear and distinct knowledge through a benevolent divinity who 
intervenes in the epistemic construction, as Jean-Luc Marion (2003, p. 416) observes, too.  It may seem 
paradoxical, but the Cartesian Ego builds itself around the very hypothesis of being deceived by someone – the 
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hypothetical evil genius. Descartes emphasizes that strange circumstance of the Ego several times: “Yet there is a 
certain deceitful spirit… who will always make it a point to cheat me. No doubt, in that case, I exist, too, since I 
am being cheated” (Descartes, 1992, p. 268).  
The critique of the Cartesian substantialist metaphysical solipsism is to be found with the analytic 
philosophers, including Gilbert Ryle, under the form of the so-called “privileged access”: only the Ego is in a 
privileged position to know its own states of mind. Yet it cannot know another Ego and neither can another one 
know it. It follows then that self-knowledge is a private sort of knowledge, which is limited to one’s own states of 
mind, which in turn cannot be accessible to an alter Ego, but only to one’s own.  
It isn’t difficult to see that a critique of self-knowledge conceived as a private endeavour does not only 
translate as an attack against a philosopher – Descartes – but also against a fundamental idea of the whole 
traditional philosophy. Wittgenstein and Ryle tackled this private knowledge from the analytic perspective of 
language, without looking at the transcendental or even metaphysical viewpoint – which, on the one hand, raised 
self-knowledge at the level of universality (since the Ego represented “human nature”) and, one the other hand, as 
far as the private experiences of the Ego, it preferred solipsism, which separated the individual, empirical, and 
physical Ego-s and their “emotions” (my pain, my pleasure) and would not acknowledge the 
transcendental/metaphysical dimension of conscience – as a valid one. If we analyse Gilbert Ryle’s critique of 
self-knowledge as conceived by traditional philosophy, we see that its starting point is, as expected, the analytic 
philosophy of language. On that methodological basis, the British philosopher underlines the identity of the 
words that accompany the term “self” in this context: self-knowledge and self-consciousness. The two notions 
(the former having a clear epistemological overtone and the latter, a psychological one) create one’s private 
access to one’s self as a private inner sub-stratum, while also disabling cognitive communication between one’s 
Ego and an alter Ego. This type of knowledge involves not a vulgar perception the body’s organs, but another 
kind – a superior one – called introspection: the faculty of the mind to notice and intuit its inner processes and 
states. From an epistemic point of view, things are clear. “I can doubt the evidence of my sensations, but not the 
verdict of my conscience or my introspection” (Ryle, 1984, p. 154). As far as the other person is concerned, the 
English thinker gives a concise expression of what “private” meant to all previous philosophers: “…I cannot 
observe another person’s conscience or the workings of their mind by introspective means. I can merely make 
feeble inferences based on the expressions of their body” (Ryle, 1984, p. 155).  
One cannot know one’s own mind or another one’s unless it is a fact related to observable behaviour. Gilbert 
Ryle’s example is easy to understand: in order to find out if a person is conceited or a patriot, I must observe their 
behaviour, their posture, their remarks, their manner of speaking, and their tone. However, the English 
philosopher rejects the validity of empathy: I can never place myself in their shoes in order to make completely 
sure whether they are patriotic or not – and this leads to the possibility of error, since the other person may have a 
special and unknown reason for her specific reaction. Hence, there is a certain sector where I am the sole 
authority that ensures the validity of my mental behaviour – as seen further on herein. 
We must stress that it is precisely the natural expression that helps us exit the transcendental/metaphysical 
realm in which the term “self”/“Ego” was constructed and used. This was also Gilbert Ryle’s point of view. The 
word “I” has a certain weight compared to other pronouns, such as “you”, “he”, “us” – and that weight is given 
by the mystifying aspect of the term, caused by the “invisibility” of the self. I can define “you” or “him” in an 
ostensible manner, but I cannot put my finger on “I”: no matter how much I would objectify myself, I cannot see 
myself as I see “you” or “him”; or otherwise said, what “you” see in “me” I cannot see – I cannot see myself with 
your eyes. It is the drama of the eye that cannot see itself. Ryle himself stresses that “I” and “you” are not names 
like the proper ones, such as “Thames”, for example. Equally, neither are such notions as temporality and space 
to be confused with the adverbs of time and place “now” and “here”, which indicate particular moments and 
places – which is why the philosopher calls them “index-words”, that point to ephemeral instances (Ryle, 1984, 
p. 179). 
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The notion of “I” does not refer to an unextended and bodiless res cogitans; on the contrary: when it is used as 
a subject, it makes sense only through reference to the body. A natural expression such as “I warmed myself by 
the fire” is explicit: the “I” can be substituted by “my body” with no restriction, which to the Cartesians would 
have been a metaphysical error. 
If the persons “I”, “you”, “he” are index-words that refer to the people that talk and act, it means that they are 
part of the network of our behaviour. I use the term “network” because, justifiably so, Gilbert Ryle stresses that 
my action interacts with your action; then actions necessarily involve the description of other notions and thus the 
public framework of practices is formed, even if that doesn’t mean that performing my actions should imply you 
performing your actions and that one modifies the other. For example, a historian studying Napoleon’s era cannot 
change the latter’s behaviour at the battle of Waterloo (Ryle, 1984, p. 182). 
3. Conclusions 
In the end, Ryle combatted both the interpretation that saw the mind as a mysterious and evanescent spirit that 
dwells in a body considered as a machine, and the one that held that mind itself was a mechanism. To go back to 
the idea that started these closing remarks: we must stress that Ryle’s chief concern seems to have been to show 
how one can build a mind/body theory without the danger of dualism or “duplicationism”, as Konstantin Kolenda 
calls it, as well as that of reductionism. The task proved to be extremely difficult, since each of the two trends has 
a rich background in the history of philosophy, given that the duplicationist tradition includes a succession of 
thinkers that starts with Plato, continues with Descartes, and it includes Husserl and the entire phenomenological 
movement, while the reductionist one includes names going from Democritus and Hobbes to Watson and 
Skinner. Ryle tried to demonstrate that through their unilaterality, both trends leave aside essential elements of 
what is specific to the human being by excellence: one’s mental life. In such circumstances, Ryle’s approach 
must be looked upon as more than a mere attempt to clarify a few questions of meta-philosophy, language logic 
or mind philosophy and rather as an attempt – crowned by some lasting successes – to make a highly-personal 
contribution to the concert of the various efforts to reclaim human nature, which characterised the previous 
century’s philosophy.  
The pages within wish to present a modern perspective for an ancient problem, which in terms of its 
demonstration does not contain any fallacies, and which seems to have resolved the issue of the mind-body 
relation for contemporary history. Although little known on the continent, the English philosopher still remains a 
reference character for both the history of philosophy and psychological debates, especially through his global 
vision on the subject. 
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